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COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE PROVIDE COMFORT:
What are we trying to do? What is the way ahead?

by

Robert D. Lewis

Major, U. S. Army


A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War
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of the Operations Department.

The contents of the paper reflect my own personal views and are
not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the
Department of the Navy.

Robert D. Lewis

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Abstract of

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What are we trying to do? What is the way ahead?

On the anniversary of the triumph of Desert Storm, American and Iraqi armed forces are still locked in a struggle wills. In the middle are up to two million Kurds. These people will be dependent on the continuation of an American commitment for their very survival. At present, this Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) sits in eastern Turkey uncertain of its mission or its role in the American security policy. The regional states watch this force as one of their gages of American commitment. America's friends equate this U.S. presence as commitment to America's engagement in regional stability. America's adversaries see the removal of the CJTF as an opening for possible aggression. It must be asked if this CJTF has larger meaning than humanitarian support for the Kurds? The United States has national interests in both the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. These interests include national, regional and specific policy goals. The CJTF can contribute to the accomplishment of these goals through the conduct of certain military missions. These missions run the spectrum of deterrence, crisis response and warfighting. There are four potential models for this CJTF. Each model must be able to support the American policy through the execution of the appropriate military missions. It must be able to execute these missions at acceptable levels of risk. At this moment we should ask: What is the CJTF attempting to accomplish? And what is the organization's "way ahead"?

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On the anniversary of the triumph of Desert Storm, American and Iraqi armed forces are still locked in a struggle wills. In the middle are up to two million Kurds. These people will be dependent on the continuation of an American commitment for their very survival. At present, this Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) sits in eastern Turkey uncertain of its mission or its role in the American security policy. The regional states watch this force as one of their gages of American commitment. America's friends equate this U.S. presence as commitment to America's engagement in regional stability. America's adversaries see the removal of the CJTF as an opening for possible aggression. It must be asked if this CJTF has larger meaning than humanitarian support for the Kurds? The United States has national interests in both the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia. These interests include national, regional and specific policy goals. The CJTF can contribute to the accomplishment of these goals through the conduct of certain military missions. These missions run the spectrum of deterrence, crisis response and warfighting. There are four potential models for this CJTF. Each model must be able to support the American policy through the execution of the appropriate military missions. It must be able to execute these missions at acceptable levels of risk. At this moment we should ask: What is the CJTF attempting to accomplish? And what is the organization's "way ahead"?

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Introduction

Nearly one year after the success of Desert Storm, American and Iraqi soldiers still face each other in a contest of national wills within the mountains of northern Iraq. In the middle are between 500,000 and 1,500,000 Kurds and other national minorities who struggle for survival within an area called the Kurdish Enclave.¹ For their foreseeable future their very survival will be dependent on commitment of the United States.

Today the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Provide Comfort remains stationed in eastern Turkey. This CJTF has been twice modified in mission and organization. It is now called CJTF Proved Comfort Residual. What is the purpose of this force? What American policies does it support? What military operations is it prepared to conduct to support these policies? My researches have demonstrated to me that these fundamental issues have not been satisfactorily answered by either the National Command Authority (NCA), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or the parent unified command (U European Command). Further, this force is neither prepared nor equipped to deal with the wide range of contingencies that might occur within the Kurdish Enclave (referred to hereafter as the Enclave). It is the purpose of this paper to this paper to attempt to identify those national policies which the CJTF appears to support. To discuss those military operations which the CJTF should be prepared to undertake. To examine the risks of these operations. And

finally, to examine four potential models for this CJTF and recommend the model which best serves the American policy.

Background

On March 2, 1991, two days after the termination of Desert Storm, Iraqi soldiers staged a spontaneous uprising within the Iraqi city of Basra.² This rebellion quickly spread throughout the Shia dominated cities of southern Iraq. To counter this threat the Hussein regime transferred forces from northern Iraq to the south. The removal of these forces gave the Kurds their chance.

Historically, the Kurds have perceived weakness in the central government as a signal to reassert their nationalist aspirations. The Kurds have conducted rebellions in each of the last three decades. The latest being the 1980's rebellion undertaken during the Iran-Iraq war. The Iraqi government has put down these revolts with special ferocity. The Iraqis have employed chemical agents on Kurdish villages.³ In fact, the water supplies of some of these villages remains contaminated to this day. The government has systematically destroyed Kurdish villages. Today these attacks have left 2 million Kurds homeless.⁴ The regime has attempted to place these displaced Kurds into "victory camps". These camps were little better than concentration camps and were administered by the Iraqi secret police. Today these atrocities constrain the viability of the Enclave to support the indigenous population.

This 1991 rebellion was led by a number of ethnic Kurd

officers of the Iraqi army. Quickly the rebellion established control over the cities of Kurdistan. With these victories the two principal political parties- the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP led by Massoud Barzani) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK led by Jalal Talabani)- emerged to establish a Kurdish state.


The rebels were able to seize large caches of arms, to include trucks, artillery, mortars, infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), tanks and even aircraft. At the high point, the Kurdish rebels had over 400,000 men under arms.⁶ During the month of March, the rebel militias were governing northern Iraq.

However, by late March, Saddam Hussein had crushed the Shia rebellion in the south. He was then able to send his forces to the north to engage the Kurds. The focus of Iraqi operations was to attack Kurdish civilian targets with an aim of creating large numbers of refugees. The Kurdish C² and logistics system quickly became overwhelmed. As a result, the Kurdish command determined to withdraw from active operations and prepare for guerrilla war. As the Iraqi army closed on the cities of Kurdistan, hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled into the high mountains on the Turkish and Iranian borders. It was the plight of these refugees which caused British Prime Minister John Major to call for the formation of a multinational force which became the conceptual basis of CJTF Provide Comfort.

By early April, forces from the United States, United Kingdom, and France began air drops of supplies to the Kurdish

refugees. PM John Major called for the establishment of a "safe haven" under UN auspices to provide a sanctuary where the Kurds could be protected and received aid. Under the leadership of the United States, a coalition was formed and established military camps within northern Iraq. From these camps, the troops from the U.S., U.K. and France distributed aid directly to the Kurds. It was hoped that the presence of these safe havens would encourage the Kurds to leave the mountains and return to Iraq.⁷ These allied forces became CJTF Provide Comfort. The forces committed included elements conducting: humanitarian, medical, logistics, and security operations. The CJTF proved very successful at getting the Kurds to return to Iraq.

Initially, the CJTF established a security zone inside of northern Iraq. This zone included all the area contained within the northern boundaries of Iraq south to the 36th parallel (see Fig. 1). This zone became known as the Kurdish Enclave. Combat troops from the Royal Marines and USMC with the support of the USAF conducted a series of southern movements which removed all of the Iraqi army and secret police units from the Enclave. Allied forces remained to provide observation posts, strongpoints and combat air patrols. American Special Operations Forces (SOF), including Special Forces and Civil Affairs battalions, established three refugee camps near the cities of Zahko, Dihok, and Amadiyah. Feeding, medical care and shelter was provided at these centers. C2 organizations were established in Turkey to coordinate the activities of the CJTF with that



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▨ Proposed expanded safe haven (see p. 12).

FIG 1



government. All CJTF operations were undertaken with the expectation that the Enclave would be turned over to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for long-term administration.⁸ This transfer has been accomplished. However, the UN has undertaken only to provide food and shelter as humanitarian assistance. To date, the UN has not provided a security mechanism.

CJTF Provide Comfort has experienced two modifications: Provide Comfort II and Provide Comfort Residual (see Fig. 2). These changes have left the CJTF without:⁹

1. A military presence within the Enclave.
2. A capability to establish a ground security or combat force within the Enclave.
3. Insufficient logistics management capabilities.
4. Insufficient rotary wing aircraft lift.
5. Insufficient battle staffing.

This force's mission is currently limited to: providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds through the UN; and providing security to the Enclave through combat air patrols (CAP). The Enclave is administered by Kurdish authorities and remains at the subsistence level. Its current location is shown in Fig. 3.


Certain Kurdish factors must be remembered when developing possible options:

1. The Kurds represent the fourth largest population groups within the Gulf Region. Further, they are region's fastest growing population. Currently they represent a population of 15 million.¹⁰

2. The Kurds are a viable national group. They identify a piece of territory as Kurdistan. The Kurds recognize an internal system of government which has successfully mobilized the


Provide Comfort

C2 - US



Provide Comfort II

C2 - US/TU



Provide Comfort RESIDUAL

C2 - US/TU








FIG. 2

FIG 3



Turkey is divided into provinces as follows:

Province	Capital	Area (sq. miles)	Population (1950)
Adana	Adana	12,300	1,200,000
Antalya	Antalya	15,000	1,500,000
Artvin	Artvin	1,500	150,000
Bartın	Bartın	1,500	150,000
Bilecik	Bilecik	1,500	150,000
Burdur	Burdur	1,500	150,000
Çankırı	Çankırı	1,500	150,000
Çarşamba	Çarşamba	1,500	150,000
Çorum	Çorum	1,500	150,000
Düzce	Düzce	1,500	150,000
Eskişehir	Eskişehir	1,500	150,000
Gaziantep	Gaziantep	1,500	150,000
İzmir	İzmir	1,500	150,000
Konya	Konya	1,500	150,000
Manisa	Manisa	1,500	150,000
Mardin	Mardin	1,500	150,000
Siirt	Siirt	1,500	150,000
Sivas	Sivas	1,500	150,000
Tatvan	Tatvan	1,500	150,000
Van	Van	1,500	150,000
Yozgat	Yozgat	1,500	150,000



CITE/ACC

Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Cyp

SCALE OF MILES
0 25 50 100 150
SCALE OF KILOMETERS
0 25 50 100 150
Capitals of Countries
Capitals of Provinces

population.¹¹

3 The Kurds represents a multinational problem in that Kurdistan cuts across the borders of five different countries- Iraq, Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Georgia. (see Fig 1).

4. The Kurds have not been satisfactorily integrated into any the five nations shown above. In fact, all of these states have practiced a policy of repression against the Kurds.

5. The Kurds have retained large amounts of arms captured during the latest uprising.¹²

Discussion

In developing options for CJTF Provide Comfort, we must explore three questions:

(1) What is the American policy for the region of the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia (SWA)?

(2) What type of operations should CJTF Provide Comfort undertake to support this policy?

(3) How can the CJTF conduct these operations within acceptable levels of risk?

American Policy: Discussion of this subject must include examination of: national security policy, regional security policy, and specific security policy vis-a-vis the Kurds/Iraq.

President Bush has spelled out four objective for American national security which are enduring. Two of these apply directly to the problems of Gulf and SWA security. First, the U.S. seeks its survival as a free and independent nation with our people and fundamental values preserved. One of the enabling concepts of this objective is the deterrence of any aggression

which threatens American security or the security of our allies. Second, the United States seeks to promote the concepts of human rights, freedom and democracy among the world's nations. Within the region, the U.S. has security commitments to both the Gulf states and Turkey. Further, the American public pronouncements state the administration support for the rights of the Kurds.

The American military seeks to support the National Security Strategy through four pillars: Strategic Deterrence, Forward Presence, Crisis Response and Reconstitution. With the context of the Gulf and Southwest Asia the execution of Forward Presence and Crisis Response are most critical. Forward Presence of American forces demonstrates U.S. commitment to both the stability of the region and tangible support to our allies. A credible forward presence enables effective intervention by either in theater or contingency forces early in regional crisis.

The regional policies are affected by the Kurdish issue include America's relations with the Gulf states and Turkey. The Gulf states and the United States share a communality of interests consisting of five components:

1. Continuation of economic growth for both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and the U.S. This growth includes the continuous flow of GCC oil.¹³

2. Retaining the framework of the GCC military coalition to include the promise of support from other Arab states (such as Egypt and Syria).¹⁴

3. Maintenance of a regional balance of military power.

This balance translates into the acquisition of weapons by GCC states in response to purchases by other nations in the region.¹⁵

4. Continued American military presence in the Gulf.

However, this presence will likely be confined to a maritime force of naval and marine assets. No American ground or air forces will be permanently stationed in the region.¹⁶

5. Insure that American ground and air forces can be re-introduced into a Gulf crisis as quickly as possible and in overwhelming strength.¹⁷ These forces can most effectively be deployed in the theater with the support of infrastructure and pre-positioned stocks located within the theater.

The relationship between the United States and Turkey is fundamentally affected by Kurdish/Iraqi problems. Inclusive in this relationship are the following factors:

1. Turkey has observed a hesitancy on the part of NATO to forcefully respond to the recent Iraqi threat. Based on the uncertainty of Alliance support, the Turkish government now seeks improved bilateral security commitments with the United States.¹⁸

2. The Turkish government welcomes an American military presence in eastern Turkey. However, the government desires any such presence to be organized within the confines of a combined Turkish-American headquarters.

3. Both the U.S. and Turkey share the desire to promote

regional stability. This stability desires the respect of all current international borders and the stability of all regional governments, to include Iraq.

4. Both the U.S. and Turkish governments are especially concerned about spector of Kurdish refugees moving into Turkey.¹⁹ Turkey desires to frame this Kurdish issue in three ways-

a. Prevent international interference with the conditions of Turkish Kurds.

b. Preclude crisis situations which might cause an influx of Kurdish refugees from Iraq, Iran, Georgia and Syria.

c. Oppose the rise of Kurdish nationalism and the call for the creation of Greater Kurdistan.

The United States is attempting to execute some very specific policies vis-a-vis the Iraqis and the Kurds. Upon study it appears that these policies are directly in conflict. These American policies include:

1. Elimination of the Iraqi capability to develop and deliver mass destruction weapons.

2. Elimination of Iraq as a regional threat, but not at the cost of regional instability.

3. Removal of the Hussein and Baathist regime and its replacement by a more democratically oriented government.

4. Retention of the territorial integrity of all of the region's states.

5. The return of the Kurdish refugees to their homes in

northern Iraq. This return is predicated on a enforceable security arrangement which will allow the Kurds to live and prosper without the threat of Iraqi military repression. President Bush has stated that such an arrangement cannot be achieved with the Hussein government in power.²⁰

These national, regional and specific policies provide the guidelines for the possible operations conducted by the CJTF. These guidelines set the following framework. First the CJTF must be able to provide emergency assistance to the Kurdish Enclave. This assistance must include humanitarian and security operations. Second the CJTF must demonstrate, with credible military operations, the American commitment to the GCC states and Turkey. Finally, the CJTF must develop the capability to assist in the deployment of American/allied forces back into the Enclave and/or the region.

CJTF Operations: The present CJTF has undertaken extremely limited operations. However, both CJTF and USEUCOM planners have indicated that these headquarters are studying much wider contingency operations for the CJTF.²¹ These operations will be undertaken to support those national, regional and specific policies previously described. What are the missions that CJTF are currently conducting?:

a. The CJTF will provide continuous support to United Nations humanitarian assistance effort within the Kurdish Enclave .

b. The CJTF will conduct operations to support UN

inspection teams which are monitoring Iraqi compliance with the Security Council resolutions and the ceasefire agreement.

It should be noted that these missions are confined to an American response to a specific crisis. In fact, the execution of these missions is dependent upon a UN request for assistance.

It appears that USEUCOM and CJTF have been unnecessarily restricted to the planning/conduct of these missions. This CJTF must be considered among the all the American military capabilities within the area. In fact, the force is the only "American cop" in the area of northern Iraq, northern Iran, Georgia and Syria. This force should plan to conduct operations which serve the wider interests of American policy. In this context, three additional missions are suggested:

1. Support regional stability through forward presence, participation in combined exercises, and military assistance.

2. Receive and employ American/allied forces in combat operations as either a single theater of operations or in support of USCENTCOM.

3. Develop within the Kurdish Enclave sufficient military capabilities to secure the Enclave from future attack by Iraqi forces.

It is important to note that with the present missions and organization that the CJTF cannot effectively conduct the above missions. Each of the five missions have specific factors which would affect their planning and execution.

Factors Affecting the Missions:

Humanitarian Assistance- To initiate this examination the observer must have an appreciation for the physical conditions of the Enclave. In repressing Kurdish unrest during the last ten years, the Iraqi army has focused on operations to destroy villages, roads, agricultural equipment and other infrastructure. The use of chemical agents has made portions of farm land and water sources unusable by humans. The result of these attacks has been to leave the Enclave incapable of supporting the population now present.²² To survive, the Enclave's population will require long term assistance. The UN Commissioner on Refugees has stated that the limit of his organization's ability to feed the Enclave is 500,000.²³

Complicating these constraints on humanitarian assistance are factors of instability. First, the border area of Iraq, Georgia, Iran and Turkey is typified by extremes in climate and terrain. A difficult winter in any of those states might well lead to an exodus of refugees to the UN feeding stations. Further, the road network from Turkey into the Enclave is extremely austere. This network can be adversely affected by weather. A second complication is the political instability in Iraq, Iran and Georgia. Political violence against the Kurds or any border minority would also cause a flood of refugees into the Enclave. Either of these two conditions would overwhelm the UN's feeding capability. A final complication is the attitude of the Iraqi government. At present, Iraq forbids its territory from being used to support the Enclave.²⁴ Iraq contends the

Enclave violates

its sovereignty. Should it desire, Iraq can conduct military operations to preclude the movement of supplies into the Enclave.

In any of the situations listed above, the UN would be forced to appeal to the Americans for support. To support larger numbers, the CJTF would be required to: assess the situation, receive airlift of supplies in eastern Turkey, bulk break these supplies, move the supplies into the Enclave via road or rotary wing aircraft, and then assist in distribution. Given active Iraqi resistance, Allied forces would be required to provide security. Presently, the CJTF is prepared to handle only the functions of: situation assessment, reception of airlifted supplies and ground transport into the Enclave. The security function is limited to air operations by combat aircraft. One observer has stated that for the CJTF to respond to any humanitarian crisis within the Enclave would require combat operations to push the Iraqi forces south of latitude 35.30.²⁵

Deter Iraqi Interference with the UN- One of America's military goals for Operation Desert Storm has been the removal of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.²⁶ This is a goal which the GCC states, Turkey and Israel have all supported. A stipulation of the Desert Storm ceasefire has been the requirement of UN weapons inspection teams to enter Iraq and conduct inquiries. These teams have been subject to harassment by Iraqi authorities. The harassment has included forcable

detention. The CJTF has been tasked by USEUCOM to provide support for these UN efforts. The CJTF is capable of executing this task completely with the following support:

1. Providing UN inspection teams with U.S. intelligence concerning the location of warheads, delivery systems and the real ground order of battle (ORBAT).

2. Providing teams with rotary wing aircraft support.

3. Providing the teams security through the use of combat air patrols within the Enclave.

4. Providing a crisis reaction team which is intended to respond to the seizing of UN teams by Iraqi authorities.

Provide Regional Stability through Presence and the Ability to Reintroduce Forces: The value of U.S. presence is twofold: it demonstrates commitment to friends and deters the activity of adversaries. The U.S. cannot define the "true value" of commitment and deterrence, rather the effectiveness of these activities must be defined by the nations of the region. The GCC states define American presence a large naval presence (surface, amphibious and air), infrastructure projects which can support U.S. forces and combined exercises.²⁷ Excluded from this perception is the permanent presence of U.S. ground forces in the Gulf. However, the GCC strongly desires a regional commitment of forces. As a result, they have embraced the long-term commitment of Army and Air Forces in eastern Turkey.

Turkey has re-evaluated its security policy in lieu of the declining Soviet threat and the increased regional threat. The

Turkish government questions the commitment of many NATO countries (such as Germany, Spain, Greece,...) to the defense of Turkey. They seek a closer bilateral security arrangement with the U.S. The Turks welcome a permanent presence, especially as this presence is in a relatively uninhabited eastern Turkey.

Among possible adversaries, both Iraq and Iran seem deterred by the U.S. presence. Iran has stated that any American presence in the Gulf should be avoided and replaced by regional security arrangements.²⁸ On the other hand, Iraq has responded favorably to UN intrusion primarily from the presence of American forces. In the case of both Iran and Iraq, a American naval presence cannot place all of possible targets at risk. From the locations in eastern Turkey, USAF assets can attack all targets in both northern Iraq and Iran (to include Tehran).

Throughout the Gulf and Southwest Asia, the Arab states were psychologically dislocated by the shattering of the myth of Arab unity.²⁹ The Iraq attack on Kuwait forced the Arab world to choose sides. Further, it demonstrated the impotence of Arab diplomacy. Given no true unity, many Arab states perceive the presence of American forces, especially ground troops, as a comforting symbol of stability.

From bases in eastern Turkey, the CJTF is advantageously positioned to support the return of forces to the Gulf. First, largescale agreements exist for the use of Turkish airspace for aerial refueling of U.S. aircraft deploying to the Gulf. Second, Turkey is willing to provide "aircraft beddown"

for tankers, AWACS and overflow fighters. Third, the CJTF is ideally positioned to conduct intelligence preparation of the battlefield for both northern Iraq and Iran. Facilities already exist for ELINT and SIGINT collection. These facilities were formerly targeted against the Soviet Union. Now these facilities could be shifted towards the Southwest Asia. With the establishment of the Enclave, American aircraft are able to overfly and collect intelligence in northern Iraq. Further, the large, dissatisfied Kurdish population provides a base to develop HUMINT assets both within Iraq and Iran. Fourth, bases in eastern Turkey have the capacity for large-scale storage of pre-positioned sustainment to include: ammunition, POL, and even materiel.³⁰

All of the above activities provide several important supports to U.S. policy. First, the establishment of a well organized CJTF is a visible demonstration of U.S. commitment. Second, the Turkish bases allow for a measure buildup of American force within a secure area. Finally, the bases can provide a real basis for sustainment which could increase the rapidity of Army and Air Force deployment into the area.

Support of Combat Operations: The CJTF could be tasked to conduct combat operations independently or in support of CINCCENT. The bases in eastern Turkey could support several combat operations. These bases can support the basing and operations of Air Force, Navy, and Marine aircraft. These aircraft can conduct strike packages deep into Iraq and

Iran to engage targets which are out of the reach of Gulf based aircraft. These bases can also support USEUCOM strategic lift assets (such as C-5/C141s). This lift can be employed to move sustainment from Turkey to the Gulf. The terrain within the Enclave is compartmentalized by mountains and valleys. It is well suited for light infantry operations against heavy forces. Using relatively few forces U.S./Allied troops could tie down large numbers of Iraq forces. Finally, the Kurdish population offers the potential for Special Operations Forces (SOF) to engage in guerrilla warfare (GW), Strategic Reconnaissance (SR), Direct Action (DA), and PSYOPS. The Kurds could be mobilized into active resistance and have the potential of engaging the entire Iraqi or Iranian northern commands.

Providing Long-Term Kurdish Security: To examine this potential mission, one must first examine the desired end state. Both the Kurds and the Iraqis agree that Kurdistan is part of Iraq.³¹ However, the Kurds believe that they should enjoy a status of a semiautonomous region within Iraq. This belief is contained within a Kurdish-Iraqi agreement developed in 1970.³² Negotiations between the Kurds and Iraqis continued to this day. It is the observation of the Kurdish leadership that the end state to these negotiations is to enact the provisions of the 1970 pact. This leadership believes that the Iraqis desire to enter Kurdistan and destroy the rebels. The Kurds believe that the only factor deterring the return of the Iraqi army is the presence of the UN Refugee Centers and CJTF Provide

Comfort. If these elements were to leave, as the UN has planned in June of this year, the Kurds are sure that the negotiations would stop and the Iraqi attack would begin.³³ Therefore, to negotiate a satisfactory security arrangement, the Kurds must have either a long term American presence or the ability to defend themselves. In the short term, Kurdish negotiating strength depends on CJTF Provide Comfort remaining in place. But as the Deputy CINCEUCOM stated, the U.S. policy position is to eventually redeploy the CJTF.³⁴ It would seem that the only logical way for the American forces to depart Turkey, while supporting a policy of protecting the Kurds, is to provide the Kurds with the means to defend themselves. From this secure situation, the Kurds could force the Iraqis to negotiate a true semiautonomous region.

An American policy supporting the creation of a secure Kurdish semiautonomous region (KSR) would have a significant impact on the region. There would be elements of stability, deterrence and instability in a KSR. How would such a condition impact the others within the region?

The Hussein regime would be significantly weakened by the establishment of a KSR. First the loss of sovereign territory would be a great loss of face. Second the KSR would provide a rallying point for Iraqi dissidents. Finally, American support of the KSR provides the threat of an American return of forces to the area. These combined factors would serve to deter further Iraqi adventures and possibly lead to Hussein's fall.

Turkish interests in the KSR are threefold. First the Turks want Iraqi Kurds to stay in Iraq. They desire to preclude a situation where large numbers of refugees move into Turkey. Second the Turks want to preclude interference with their Kurdish citizens. Finally the Turks do not want an independent Kurdistan. Such a state would draw Turkish Kurds from Turkey. Further, such a state would doubtless have territorial claims against Turkey. If these interests can be satisfied, the Turks would support a KSR.

Iran's interests closely parallel Turkey's. Iran is also concerned with Kurdish refugees and Kurdish nationalism. She would also seek to limit American, European or Turkish involvement in the region. Within this context, a secure KSR would look very appealing. It should be noted that a KSR would be economically dependent of trade with both Turkey and Iran.³⁵ Under such conditions both of these governments should feel free of any Kurdish nationalist threat

The principal concerns of the GCC states are twofold. A viable KSR would serve as a model to dissatisfied minority groups within GCC nations. Further a viable KSR might add to instability as the effects of Kurdish nationalism is felt within the Gulf.

On the whole, there appears agreement in certain general areas among the region's states (less Iraq). The regional states believe that once the CJTF leaves that the Iraqis will repress the Enclave. All agree that the Kurds represent a legitimate and

dangerous national group. Further the growth rate in the Kurdish population demands a solution to their desires. All states desire some degree of protection from the influence of Kurdish nationalism. All are willing to support some type of semiautonomous/quasi independent Kurdish region confined to northern Iraq.³⁶

How should the CJTF conduct operations within acceptable levels of risks?

There are four models for the CJTF (see Fig. 4). Each model should meet a well determined criteria. The first criteria should be does the model's mission support the national policy vis-a-vis the area? It should be remembered that this policy may be summarized as:

The United States seeks to support allies, deter adversaries through promotion of regional stability. This stability can be obtained through forward presence in the area of Southwest Asia. The U.S. desires the elimination of Iraq as a regional threat. The U.S. is committed to the security and survival of the Kurds. This commitment is based primarily on humanitarian concerns. However, the public aspect of this commitment has tied the U.S. to seeking a long-term solution to the problem.


The second criteria is do the CJTF's military operations establish the conditions which enhance the policy? Finally, what is the level of risks associated with the model? Is the model responsive or escalatory?(Fig. 5 presents a comparisons of each model.)

Model 1: Creation of a UN Support Force:


Overview: This model states that the UN has assumed responsibility for all humanitarian and security activities

CJTTF MODELS


MODEL 1



MODEL 2



MODEL 3



MODEL 4 : SAME AS 3, BUT GCC AND JSOTF DEPLOY INTO ENCLAVE

CJTF OPTIONS FOR CONFIGURATIONS

	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4
1. HUMANITARIAN ASSIST.	medium	medium	HIGH	HIGH
2. SUPPORT UN BY DETECTING IRAQIS	LOW	medium	HIGH	HIGH
3. PROVIDE STABILITY 4. TO GULF	LOW	medium	HIGH	HIGH
6 TO TURKEY	LOW	medium	HIGH	MEDIUM - LOW
4 RE-INTRODUE FORCE	LOW	LOW	HIGH	HIGH
5. WARFIGHTING	LOW	LOW	medium	medium
6 LONG TERM KURDISH SECURITY	LOW	LOW	medium	medium
7. RISK	LOW	medium	medium	LOW
TOTALS	H 0 M 1 L 7	H 0 M 5 L 3	H 5 M 3 L 0	H 4 M 3 L 1

HIGH - SUCCESS LIKELY

MEDIUM - LIKELY SUCCESS OR UNSUCCESS

LOW - LIKELY FAILURE

within the Enclave. Under this model, the CJTF would be disestablished. In its place, EUCOM would commit those command and logistic functions which would enable U.S. forces to support humanitarian assistance as requested by the UN. This force can be based in the same locations currently occupied by the CJTF.

Policy: This model does not support any American policy. It is limited to responding to UN requests for assistance on the grounds of humanitarian concern.

Operational Capabilities: As indicated in Fig. 5, this model has extremely limited capabilities. The model can only provide assistance through the receipt and movement of humanitarian aid to the UN refugee centers in the Enclave. This assistance would consist of the transfer of supplies from American airlift to Turkish privately contracted vehicles.

Risk: The model provides two risks. First, it cannot respond to a crisis within the Enclave. Should conditions occur that would cause the Kurdish refugee population to swell above 500, 000 people the UN would be incapable of responding. Such an instance would require U.S. forces to redeploy to the area and takeover the humanitarian assistance effort. This American response would mean large numbers of S0F, CA and logistics personnel returning to the Enclave. Second, this model depends on Iraqi good will. The UN has not been empowered to employ a peacekeeping force. Therefore, the Hussein regime can stop the assistance anytime it chooses.

Model 2- Continuation of the Current CJTF Provide
Comfort Residual:

Overview: This CJTF model would retain the current capabilities within their bases in eastern Turkey. Under this model the CJTF possesses the resources to provide humanitarian assistance, assist UN inspectors and provide a forward presence within Iraq through the flights of combat aircraft.

Policy: This model can support to a limited respect all aspects of American policy. Its particular weaknesses consist of two factors. First it has the same weaknesses from the aspect of humanitarian assistance as Model 1. Second its combat/security limitations may make it not very credible.

Operational Capabilities: Fig. 5 shows that the force lacks capabilities in the areas of humanitarian assistance, providing stability, re-introduction of forces and combat operations. The model does not contribute to long-term Kurdish security. This CJTF model would also require augmentation to assume the humanitarian assistance role from the UN.

Without a ground component, the force lacks the ability to threaten or eject any Iraqi penetration within the Enclave. Further, the original withdrawal of the ground component has signaled to the region a lessening of U.S. interest and will. The Iraqis have, in fact, moved forces into several villages in the Enclave,³⁷ These factors have steadily eroded the stability value of this CJTF model.

This CJTF model can accept, but not employ forces. Plans

and agreements under the NATO framework provide for the flow of American reinforcements into eastern Turkey. However, this CJTF model lacks the C², intelligence, communications and sustainment staff to employ any joint combat forces. Such functions would have to be provided by the NATO command Land Forces Southeast (LANDSOUTHEAST). Such an arrangement would require NATO concurrence and is unlikely.

Finally this model provides not mechanism to obtain an end solution to the Kurdish problem. It does not provide enough of a credible threat to induce Iraqi concession, nor does it provide for long term Kurdish security.

Risk: This model has one risk. Can it respond adequately to Iraqi escalation in the Enclave? As stated above, Iraqi forces are testing the American resolve by moving into the Enclave. Without a ground component, the CJTF cannot respond in a meaningful way.

Model 3- Establish the CJTF as a Permanent Regional CJTF

Overview: This model requires as its basis a stated American policy which claims that vital national interests call for the forward basing of air and ground forces in eastern Turkey. This model requires the establishment of a complete combined and joint staff headquartered in Turkey. It would also include modest land and air forces. These forces might be assigned on a permanent basis or attached for specific periods of time.

Policy: This model can contribute to all national policies. The presence of a credible, balanced force signals clear American intent to remain engaged. Further, through the use of exercises, such as Display Determination, this CJTF can demonstrate its abilities to receive and employ forces. This demonstration will serve to both stabilize and deter.

Operational Capabilities: This model requires a headquarters with representation of all air/land functional areas. The staff would plan contingency operations ranging from regional humanitarian assistance to combat operations throughout the region. The headquarters would become the data base for intelligence, communications architecture, and sustainment information. Further, from its forward location the CJTF could monitor the intent and capabilities of the region's potential adversaries. As seen in Fig. 4, this CJTF has sufficient capabilities to conduct all missions. Of special note is the SOF component which enables the CJTF to conduct security assistance (SAO and foreign internal defense (FID) operations in support of the Kurds.

Risk: This model contains relatively little risk. By basing its elements in eastern Turkey, the CJTF prevents possible confrontation with the Iraqis. However, the CJTF retains the ability to raise the level of confrontation, if the NCA desires. The chief risk would occur during foray's into the Enclave. Each time a CJTF element entered the Enclave it would risk ambush by Iraqi forces. However, if the CJTF is given

sufficient rotary wing lift, forces exposed to danger could be quickly withdrawn.

Model 4-- Enclave deployed CJTF:

Overview: In this model, the CJTF deploys ground forces into the Enclave on a permanent basis, while retaining its headquarters and sustainment in eastern Turkey. The primary role of these forces would be security of the Enclave and preparing the Kurds for eventual self-defense.

Policy: The model support all stated policies. It leans heavily towards establishing the security situation as an enabling action for: humanitarian assistance, stability and regional deterrence. Its chief attraction is that it requires the CJTF to become proactive. The CJTF will seek to establish a self-defense capability among the Kurds with the view of enhancing the Kurdish position vis-a-vis the Huessein regime in their negotiations. The goal of these negotiations would be the creation of a self protecting KSR. This task would call upon the functions of SA, FID and other nation building steps.

Operational Capabilites: This model can also accomplish all of the missions. It will be noted that it relies heavily on SOF to: train and equip Kurdish forces, to provide engineering, medical and vetinary services, and to assist the Kurds in establishing governmental goods and services. It also relies heavily on forward deployed light infantry and combat aircraft to provide security. The chief weakness in this model is that the security deployment must stay in place until the

Kurds are capable of assuming the task. The CJTF must retain all the capabilities of model 3 as well.

Risk: Employment of this model is an escalatory step. It must surely provoke an Iraqi reaction. The question of risk would come with whatever American response would be forthcoming. A second risk would come from the long term employment of American forces in "nation-building". The risk comes from the adequacy of Kurdish institutions to ever reach the point of self government. Will the U.S. ever be able to transfer the security function to the Kurds?

Conclusion

Foremost in this conclusion are the questions of policy, operational support of policy, and risk. Which model best supports these questions?

Institution of Model 1 would require a major revision of policy. Under this model, the U.S withdraws from the pursuit of its interests within the region. This abbreviates American policies of regional stability and deterrence. Further, this model is also signals to the Gulf and Turkey that the American interest and will is waning. Finally, support of this model is in direct conflict with the American public support of the Kurds. Instead the American policy becomes no more than an extension of UN activity. It is believed by all regional observers that selection of such a model would result in aggression by the Iraqi government against the Enclave. This model has no mechanism to respond to such aggression. Therefore

model is rejected in as an unsuitable response to the stated policy.

Model 2 is much more difficult to assess. With regards to suitability, the model is dependent on the perceived level of commitment which it provides in the areas of stability and deterrence among the area's states. The model is not feasible with regards to the missions of reintroduction of forces and warfighting. The CJTF's assets for C3I, maneuver, fire support and sustainment would require significant upgrade to accomplish either mission. The model is also unsuitable to accomplish long term security for the Kurds. Execution of this model will lead to eventual aggression by the Iraqis to which the CJTF is incapable of responding. Model 2 is therefore rejected.

Model 4 is the boldest of all approaches. It presumes that the Kurdish security problem can be solved. With the resources available, all missions are feasible and acceptable with one exception. Even with forces deployed within the Enclave to protect and train the Kurds, there is no guarantee that the Kurds would ever be able to assume their own security. Under such doubts the likely risks are unacceptable. This model is unnecessarily escalatory. It compels an Iraqi response. Also, there is little indication that American allies would support it. Finally, the fractured nature of Kurdish politics suggest that this model may be incapable of reaching the desired end state. Model 4 is rejected as unacceptable due to the risk.

Model 3 can accomplish all required missions with the

exception of long-term Kurdish security. It is suitable and feasible. It is a opened demonstration of American commitment. And it is currently acceptable to American allies. Further, its presence will deter Iraqi agresion in the Enclave. This stalemate situation can lead to satisfactory Kurdish-Iraqi negotiations. The model enjoys the benefits of controlled risk. That is, CJTF forces are out of reach of the Iraqi armed forces, but have the capability for rapid employment into the Enclave during crisis. After a crisis, these forces can be withdrawn from the Enclave, but retained in Tureky as a credible threat. This flexibility allows American decisionmakers to escalate/de-escalate the threat as an instrument of policy. Due to its relatively low risk, Model 3 is the most acceptable.

Recommendations

Model 3 is the selected option, the following recommendations apply:

1. An American policy must be articulated developing the logic of long term commitment of forces to the CJTF. This policy must provide satisfactory goals for this forces which are acceptable to America's allies and its public.
2. Establish complete CJTF staff with a single function (not dual hatted) commander. This command and staff must be capable of accepting reinforcements and functioning as a warfighting regional joint task force.
3. Establish basing, sustainment and prepositioning agreements with the Turkish authorities to support return of forces to the region.
4. Employ exercises (such as Display Determination) to demonstrate the credibility of the CJTF.

5. Prepare for the support of Kurdish forces in the face of Iraqi aggression.

6. Rotate USEUCOM air, land, sea and SOF units through duty with the CJTF. Recommended force structure: one light brigade task force, one composite air wing, Mediterranean carrier based aircraft and MEU, and one Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF).

This model provides the most benefits at the least cost. Further, it possesses the flexibility to increase American activity vis-a-vis the Kurds. It is therefore the option which establishes the military situation of regional security, which will allow for a negotiated peace.

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